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Building biosecurity for synthetic biology
Benjamin D Trump1,* , SE Galaitsi1, Evan Appleton2, Diederik A Bleijs3, Marie-Valentine Florin4,
Jimmy D Gollihar5, R Alexander Hamilton6, Todd Kuiken7 , Filippa Lentzos8, Ruth Mampuys9,
Myriam Merad10, Tatyana Novossiolova11, Kenneth Oye4,12, Edward Perkins1, Natàlia Garcia-Reyero1,
Catherine Rhodes13 & Igor Linkov1
The fast-paced field of synthetic biology is
fundamentally changing the global biose-
curity framework. Current biosecurity
regulations and strategies are based on
previous governance paradigms for
pathogen-oriented security, recombinant
DNA research, and broader concerns
related to genetically modified organisms
(GMOs). Many scholarly discussions and
biosecurity practitioners are therefore
concerned that synthetic biology outpaces
established biosafety and biosecurity
measures to prevent deliberate and mali-
cious or inadvertent and accidental misuse
of synthetic biology’s processes or prod-
ucts. This commentary proposes three
strategies to improve biosecurity: Security
must be treated as an investment in the
future applicability of the technology;
social scientists and policy makers should
be engaged early in technology develop-
ment and forecasting; and coordination
among global stakeholders is necessary to
ensure acceptable levels of risk.
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A ll technology has dual-use aspects: Itcan be used for beneficial and harm-ful purposes. The Internet is a source
of limitless information and interaction but
it also enables much criminal behavior
under the guise of anonymity. Similarly,
synthetic biology (SB) has great potential for
beneficial and valuable applications and
products but could also be misused to harm
humans or the environment. Governance
regimes must therefore balance mitigating
the risk of misuse with supporting opportu-
nities for innovation and development.
However, biosecurity efforts remain mired
in uncertainty about the capabilities of SB
and its practitioners’ motivations in the
growing number of contexts in which it is
applied. Two decades into the 21st century,
governments are still imposing old rules on
a new technology, an insufficient strategy to
provide security in the future.
Though it lacks a universal definition, SB
has been described as “designing and
constructing biological modules, biological
systems, and biological machines or, re-
design of existing biological systems for
useful purposes” (Nakano et al, 2013). The
Engineering Biology Research Consortium
(EBRC) puts SB in an evolutionary context
that “builds on the advances in molecular,
cell, and systems biology” to design and
construct genetic circuits, metabolic path-
ways, or other constructs to address defined
objectives. Building an effective biosecurity
strategy that covers these SB design
approaches and technologies requires under-
standing the novel threats that these tech-
nologies create, along with the structural
vulnerabilities products stemming from
these technologies can exploit and the likely
causes of inadequate biosecurity practices.
New concerns arise from SB’s broad scope,
wider availability, complexity, and uncer-
tainty over current and future capabilities.
One very critical technology is gene editing
to precisely modify genomes. One of its
applications, gene drive, has raised particu-
lar concerns as it can quickly propagate a
specific suite of genes or alleles through a
population by circumventing Mendelian
inheritance and thereby increasing the prob-
ability that these genes are passed on to
offspring.
Gene editing has enormous potential for
improving human health, agriculture, and
the environment, but it can also cause
substantial and irreversible harms. Such
harms might include the uncontrolled diffu-
sion of gene-edited material in the environ-
ment, off-target effects from genome editing,
or the disruption of ecologies with geneti-
cally altered organisms, especially with engi-
neered gene drive systems. Harms may also
arise through the deliberate use of these
techniques to target humans and/or the
environment. Such intentional misuse of SB
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techniques requires two circumstances: the
availability of techniques and know-how
that could be exploited for irresponsible or
nefarious purposes (“information hazard”);
and the ability to use such knowledge and
tools to generate and disseminate harmful
engineered organisms.
Such knowledge includes the publication
of a method for synthesizing horsepox; some
critics argue that this information might
reasonably enable a nefarious actor to recon-
stitute smallpox or to synthetize other
viruses. Additionally, the widely publicized
sequence and recreation of the 1918 Spanish
Influenza virus, which killed some
50 million people at the close of the First
World War (Evans & Selgelid, 2015), could
enable other actors to cause harm. Even non-
pathogenic approaches have been described
as dual-use research, ranging from the
disruption of local ecologies via gene drives
to the manipulation or destruction of inor-
ganic materials through engineered bacteria.
Potential misusers
These and other cases show that interested
actors or parties can acquire information
and apply existing tools for advanced
genetic engineering with limited to no over-
sight. Those who may choose to misuse SB
could possess a broad diversity of back-
grounds, motivations, strategic goals, and
resources. From a top-down perspective,
classical global biosecurity has focused on
state actors with the scientific and techno-
logical know-how to pursue offensive
biological research, including infamous
examples such as Imperial Japan’s Unit 731
during World War II, as well as postwar
biological weapons programs in the UK, the
USSR, and the USA. Typically, such offen-
sive biological weapons capabilities were
framed as “first strike” options or avenues
to destabilize enemy ground forces that
would not easily be deterred by conven-
tional ordnance, such as the Hussein
Government’s development of bioweapons
during the Iran-Iraq War via anthrax, botu-
linum toxin, and aflatoxin. In each instance,
states developed scientific and materiel
capability to construct, package, and deploy
biological weapons for strategic measures.
More recently, the pursuit of biological
weapons has extended to non-state organi-
zations. For example, al-Qaeda (anthrax)
and Aum Shinrikyo (anthrax, botulinum
toxin) both demonstrated an interest in
bioweapons but with very limited success
given the technological constraints at the
time. However, even individuals or small
cells have increased in number and destruc-
tive potential. Among the most infamous
examples is Bruce Edwards Ivins, who
according to the US Department of Justice,
leveraged institutional resources as the sole
actor responsible for the 2001 deployment of
anthrax in letters to Congress and the media.
Other actors could be disgruntled employees
of sophisticated scientific laboratories or
vengeful academics. As advances in genetic
engineering become more accessible to
private persons, a question remains regard-
ing the rate-limiting steps (e.g., technical
knowledge or inspiration) for such individ-
ual actors or small groups to pursue more
sophisticated biological weapons.
Currently, significant barriers remain for
independent actors to access critical equip-
ment and materials, but oversight organiza-
tions are not prepared for a future when
intangible transfers reduce or overcome
these obstacles. In 1975, the US National
Institutes of Health (NIH) established
compliance measures for genome engineer-
ing that were enforced through funding
restrictions; however, much SB research
now operates without NIH funding, approval
or even awareness, and NIH does not over-
see research in other countries. Today, the
financial costs, time limitations, and skill
requirements needed to use SB tools have
scaled down to become even more broadly
accessible. Furthermore, the requisite base-
line knowledge will diminish over time as
SB processes become more streamlined.
While such broad access to sophisticated
genetic engineering knowledge and equip-
ment can accelerate scientific break-
throughs, it also places the responsibility of
biosecurity on a near-infinite number of
unsupervised actors across the globe (Fig 1).
Indeed, in 2018, the States Parties to the
Biological Weapons Convention (BWC)
noted that access to technologies such as
gene editing, gene drives, and gene synthesis
is increasingly being conferred to actors with
limited or no oversight from established
industry or governmental organizations,
raising concerns about potential violations
of the BWC.
Lack of oversight
It is helpful to forecast and understand
looming threats and potential mitigation
strategies at various scales, but international
treaties are not structured to oversee
bottom-up efforts related to SB below the
national scale. One response may be more
engagement by overseeing agencies such as
the NIH. Another option is the Responsible
Research and Innovation (RRI) approach to
assess societal implications of emerging
research to better align processes and
expected outcomes with the needs and
values of society. Where top-down gover-
nance proves insufficient, other actors such
as universities, non-profits, and companies
will need to act as gatekeepers and watch-
dogs to protect against nefarious actors.
Top-down governance may then support
such initiatives, which will require harmo-
nization and communication at the interna-
tional level.
Long-standing biosecurity policy prac-
tices appear to have gaps in biosecurity
oversight for SB. These policies include the
framing of security as a cost or undesirable
expense; the siloing of scholarship and prac-
tice across disciplinary domains and
between academia, government, industry,
and civil society; and the narrow framing of
security issues that ignore technology devel-
opments. Each of these concerns could be
addressed by policy solutions that both
support technological development and miti-
gate security threats while facilitating public
engagement in SB and investment in its
products. These policies must be scalable,
transferrable, and adaptable to incorporate
emerging technical and social challenges.
Security must be an investment, not
a cost
Investment implies allocating resources with
the expectation of greater gains in the future.
To incentivize investments in biosecurity,
the entity that provides the initial resources
must therefore have a share in future bene-
fits. At present, however, biosecurity is
framed as an obligation for individual scien-
tists, organizations, and companies to use
institutional funds to comply with unstated
and often ambiguous needs for general secu-
rity. This is an unstable balance of costs and
benefits, and thus, few institutions prefer to
minimize expenditures associated with ful-
filling basic oversight requirements (Gillum
et al, 2018). Yet, the best argument in favor
of investing in biosecurity is that SB’s devel-
opment requires public acceptance, which
remains tentative at present (Oliver, 2018).
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Such acceptance could drop precipitously if
the public is inadvertently exposed to harm
as a result of a lack of oversight. Biosecurity
therefore requires an approach that incen-
tivizes managers to keep abreast of risks and
concerns. Biosecurity can signal to the
general public that SB products have been
appropriately screened to assure beneficial
uses. The US Nuclear Regulatory Commis-
sion (nrc.gov) performs this for research
and test reactors, mostly in universities or
colleges, but there is no analogous commis-
sion for biosecurity.
The members of the International Gene
Synthesis Consortium (IGSC)—which are
most of the DNA synthesis companies—
devote company resources to screening
customers and their requests for potential
security issues: This is in the best interests
of the companies, despite the fact that no
legal mandate requires them to do so. Simi-
larly, in January 2020, the Nuclear Threat
Initiative (NTI) and the World Economic
Forum recommended in a report the estab-
lishment of a Technical Consortium to
develop a common DNA sequence screening
mechanism, following up on work and
conclusions by the IGSC. Across such
efforts, Industry has realized that companies
stand to gain from aligning themselves with
the risk aversion of the public and to invest
accordingly in security. This was the lesson
for the chemical industry that initially
lobbied against the 1925 Geneva Protocol
against chemical weapons and prevented its
ratification for 50 years in the USA (Tucker,
2007). Today’s chemical industry is a strong
advocate of chemical arms control (e.g., The
Responsible Care Programme).
Bridges are needed between
biosecurity experts, social scientists,
and practitioners
Many emerging technologies develop out of
sight of social scientists and policy commen-
tators (Linkov et al, 2018). Institutional
incentives to advance science and technol-
ogy usually do not create opportunities for
inquiry and discussion between developers,
risk assessors, ethicists, and policy analysts
at the early stages of research. As a result,
social science discussions, especially those
that the public may relate to such as
concerns related to ethics, morals, and risk
to health, are often relegated to an after-
thought and isolated within institutions or
organizations. To address the problem, the
RRI programs in the UK and the EU involve
experts from diverse fields to assess scien-
tific advancement with the aim of mitigating
risk, upholding core morals and values, and
achieving research commodification in equi-
table and sustainable means. Measures such
as RRI are not intended to block research or
publication of results, but to reduce
downstream harms that might place devel-
opers, companies, and governments poten-
tially responsible for expensive cleanup
and/or insurance efforts. More social inquiry
alongside significant funding for SB will
improve deliberation into potential biosecu-
rity threats and reduce the potential for
unexpected dual-use publications or devel-
opments.
The lack of transparency within the
process of technical development removes
an essential opportunity to consider whether
an idea or goal presents a biosecurity hazard
that broader society will not condone. A
recent example includes Dr. Jiankui He’s
work to produce the world’s first genome-
edited babies in late 2018. His experiments
were widely condemned by leading biolo-
gists around the world, yet the small circle
of people and institutions that engaged with
his experiment while it was underway did
nothing to stop him (Cohen, 2019). Broader
engagement may have shifted or even halted
Dr. He’s work to better align with global
norms and expectations for human experi-
mentation.
The future of biosecurity must be a
collective global effort
Neither “synthetic biology” nor “biosecu-
rity” has a universally accepted definition,
leaving states and organizations to include
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Figure 1. Increasing number of global users able to access genetic engineering (blue) and synthetic biology (orange) technologies over time.
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or exclude lines of research depending on
their risk tolerance or incentives in pursuing
specific goals. Though conventions such as
the BWC and Chemical Weapons Conven-
tion (CWC) provide common ground related
to weaponry, the ethics and practices that
support their objectives are not necessarily
taught or enforced within all institutions.
Institutional, political, and economic
influences shape local attitudes toward the
perception, management, and communica-
tion of risk from emerging technologies,
requiring that biosecurity measures are
tailored to different national and institutional
contexts. However, biosecurity equally
represents a global public good, requiring
international dialogue and collaboration to
achieve minimum biosecurity standards.
Where some governments or industries may
adopt a precautionary approach to manage
uncertain biological threats, others may be
more risk tolerant and thereby more vulnera-
ble to certain threats. Countries may also
avoid disclosing information about their
activities or committing themselves to any
restrictions on behaviors.
Challenges stemming from diverging
practices of SB biosecurity governance are
exacerbated by the increasingly globalized,
dispersed, and distributed nature of the
technology and its research. Advanced
biological research is no longer dominated
by the Western world, and this may require
different approaches to or priorities for
biosecurity. Russia’s Federal Research
Programme for Genetic Technologies Devel-
opment for 2019–2027 intends to “imple-
ment a comprehensive solution to the task
of the accelerated development of genetic
technologies, including genetic editing. . .”
Saudi Arabia is funding research to develop
microbial cell factories to produce fuels and
chemicals, while Singapore is investing
considerable resources into life and environ-
mental sciences research. The Chinese
Academy of Sciences is establishing an Insti-
tute of Synthetic Biology, which is tasked
with the dual responsibilities of fostering
roadmaps for future development while
establishing safety and security norms for
researchers at Chinese institutions. There
are no top-down efforts beyond existing
mechanisms like the BWC or the CWC to
standardize global governance and usage of
SB, and bottom-up efforts are not coordi-
nated in their reach or messaging.
Newcomers to SB may have differing
tolerances and understandings of risk than
more experienced technology developers.
The implications, though vast, can be
grouped into two general areas. One
includes diverging safety and security prac-
tices at various points of an international
supply chain that forms the backbone of an
increasingly globalized economy. Another
includes the potential for small-scale experi-
ments to escape national biosecurity control
and spill across political boundaries. While
one country may find the environmental risk
of a particular SB application acceptable, its
spread across borders into another country
may disrupt those local ecologies or expose
vulnerable human, animal, and plant popu-
lations to irreversible consequences. The
nature of certain SB applications, in particu-
lar gene drive, makes it impossible for risk-
averse countries to wholly quarantine them-
selves from another country’s decisions.
This is also an issue of equity: Risk-tolerant
countries will reap the rewards when benefi-
cial technologies emerge, while risk-averse
countries may bear their neighbor’s risks
without any means to capture potential
rewards.
An environment of competing and incon-
gruent risk architectures causes individual
states, organizations, or industries to arrive
at differing definitions of security threats or
acceptable levels of loss in pursuit of a tech-
nology’s gains. For a technology as uncer-
tain as SB, this may set governments,
companies, and other research organizations
down vastly differing policy paths and
impede consensus to assure security for
anyone.
Increasing monetary and
non-monetary benefits and
reducing risks
Many individuals and organizations are
actively tackling the biosecurity challenge.
The International Genetically Engineered
Machine (iGEM) synthetic biology competi-
tion, which began in 2004, mandates that
organizational leaders and judges conduct
rigorous reviews of the materials and
planned experiments of each team. Safety
and security concerns receive further scru-
tiny from iGEM’s Safety and Security
Committee (SSC) and are screened for poten-
tial hazards by a commercial partner; all of
this is part of the competition’s guidance for
participating students (Millett et al, 2019).
Biosecurity precautions are also incorpo-
rated in the “Do-It-Yourself” (DIY) biology
community’s code of ethics in North Amer-
ica and Europe (DIYbio.org), the statement
of shared purpose from MIT’s Bio Summit
2.0 (www.biosummit.org), the priority of
the States Parties to the BWC to establish a
code of conduct (Meeting of the States
Parties, 2018), the construction of biosecu-
rity norms practices by the African Union for
transgenic insects and genetically modified
crops (Glover et al, 2018), and Australian
foreign policy. There is a growing demand
for an update to international biosecurity
norms and practices akin to the Cartagena
Protocol on Biosafety, to increase trans-
parency, cooperation, and collective security
in pursuit of SB.
Yet, a question remains of how to invest
and incentivize biosecurity with private
actors? Such an answer requires focus not
only on bench scientists, but also on vari-
ous gatekeepers, overseers, and watchdogs
involved in biotechnology research and
development (e.g., the World Organisation
for Animal Health’s Guideline for Responsi-
ble Conduct in Veterinary Research). For
example, the furtherance of dual-use
research might be better controlled by
training journal editors on what constitutes
a potential information hazard within arti-
cle submissions. Such considerations
extend to the grant review process, where
funders can require an up-to-date under-
standing of possible information and secu-
rity hazards that may ensue over the
course of the proposed work. In these and
other instances, top-down and bottom-up
collaboration is necessary to raise biosecu-
rity awareness and to identify security
threats, while bottom-up organizations,
agencies, and universities conduct on-the-
ground passive surveillance of possible
dual-use security threats.
One example of this fusion includes the
US Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI),
which has sponsored and been working
with iGEM to increase awareness of risks
and to gain an understanding of possible or
developing threats. Though no biosecurity
effort will eliminate all threats—nor is such
an environment desirable if it means
universally forbidding research and innova-
tion that can greatly benefit society—a
layering of strengths and capabilities by
government and private institutions will
provide a more unified effort for biosecurity
and might disincentivize actors from lever-
aging gaps in oversight to develop a biolog-
ical weapon.
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Conclusions
SB is a transformative technology poised to
have at least as much impact as the digital
revolution. As with scientific breakthroughs of
the past two centuries, the potential for its
misuse is globally present and warrants scru-
tiny at the highest levels of policy discourse.
While some protection may be provided by
developing specific countermeasures, preven-
tative action may be more reliable. Biosecurity
policies and practices must be updated to
accommodate the novel challenges associated
with SB and acknowledge the globalized and
diverse nature of its threat space.
Effective global biosecurity will not
happen quickly nor will it be enthusiasti-
cally adopted by all governments or non-
governmental organizations. Incentives to
misuse synthetic biology with harmful
consequences remain high for certain negli-
gent actors, and the coming years may see
such events affecting human, animal, or
environmental health. Successful biosecurity
implementation must be adaptable to
quickly incorporate uncertainty as well as
new capabilities. Urgent steps are required
to place such notions into practice before a
major threat incident, both to prevent the
damage and subsequent policy reactions
that could limit or ban technology platforms
entirely. Now is the time to take steps to
apply biosecurity to maximize technological
benefits while minimizing its dual-use
potential by improving the framing, prioriti-
zation, and governance of biosecurity risks.
Disclaimer
The statements herein are the author’s opin-
ions only and not necessarily representative
of their host institutions.
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